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The First Amendment and Commercial Speech 
C. EDWIN BAKER* 
INTRODUCTION 
The world would do well not to follow the lead of the United States in its view that 
commercial speech is an aspect of free speech. If guidance were sought, rather than the 
current American view developed over the last thirty years, greater wisdom would be 
found in the earlier American view that commercial speech has nothing to do with such 
freedom. With this in mind, Part II of this Article offers three arguments that I have 
previously advanced for excluding commercial speech from First Amendment 
protection and one additional argument that, though I have never offered it, is 
provocative and I largely endorse. First, however, Part I gives a very brief history of 
the U.S. constitutional treatment of commercial speech and a possibly controversial 
characterization of its current status. 
 
I. HISTORY 
Though the constitutional idea of free speech had a robust political life in the United 
States during the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the Supreme Court first gave 
free speech serious attention in the twentieth century. Even then, the Court did not find 
a federal statute to violate the First Amendment until 1965 in Lamont v. Postmaster 
General.1 Nevertheless, ever since the early 1930s, U.S. courts have actively protected 
speech and press freedom. Still, little thought was given to commercial advertising. 
When the constitutional status of commercial speech first reached the Supreme Court 
in Valentine v. Chrestensen,2 the Court spent three sentences disposing of it: one to 
                                                                                                                 
 
 * Nicholas F. Gallicchio Professor of Law and Professor of Communication, University 
of Pennsylvania Law School. This Article was originally delivered as a conference paper at a 
symposium held by the Center for American Law of the University of Paris II (Panthéon-Assas) 
on January 18–19, 2008. For the French version of this Article, see C. Edwin Baker, Le Premier 
Amendement et la publicité commerciale, in LA LIBERTÉ D’EXPRESSION AUX ÉTATS-UNIS ET EN 
EUROPE 9 (Élisabeth Zoller ed., 2008). The normative theory that constitutes the substance of 
this Article can be found in Commercial Speech: A Problem in the Theory of Freedom, 62 IOWA 
L. REV. 1 (1976), and more fully developed in HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 
(1989). I developed the argument of Part II.C in Property and its Relation to Constitutionally 
Protected Liberty, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 741 (1986). The current state of law on commercial 
speech is described in Paternalism, Politics, and Citizen Freedom: The Commercial Speech 
Quandary in Nike, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1161 (2004). Not discussed here, but important to 
understanding commercial speech, is the constitutional distinction between the (commercial) 
press and those commercial speakers who are properly subject to regulation, and the difference 
between the constitutional rationales for protecting individual speech and for protecting the 
commercial press. In addition to the first two sources cited above, I consider these issues 
primarily in Turner Broadcasting: Content-Based Regulation of Persons and Presses, 1994 SUP. 
CT. REV. 57, and The Independent Significance of the Press Clause Under Existing Law, 35 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 955 (2007). 
 1. 381 U.S. 301 (1965). 
 2. 316 U.S. 52 (1942). 
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state the issue, a second to say that if the behavior regulated had not been commercial 
advertising then the First Amendment would restrain the state’s power to regulate, and 
a third that said the Court was “clear that the Constitution imposes no such restraint on 
government as respects to purely commercial advertising.”3 This quick disposal 
remained the law for over thirty years. During this period, the only doctrinal issue that 
concerned the Court was whether something was properly characterized as commercial 
speech. It concluded, for example, that despite newspapers’ commercial goal of being 
profitable businesses, neither a newspaper’s content nor a newspaper advertisement 
placed by civil rights leaders discussing public issues constituted commercial speech.4 
The 1950s and 1960s saw a huge proliferation of First Amendment scholarship but 
virtually none that dealt with commercial speech. With the exception of a somewhat 
perfunctory treatment by Thomas Emerson, who saw commercial speech as part of the 
system of commerce, not the system of free expression, and Alexander Meiklejohn, 
who dismissed commercial advertising as not related to the democratic political ideal 
of self-government, no theoretical explanation for denial of protection was offered.5 
Then Martin Redish, in an important article, stepped into this vacuum. He argued that 
commercial speech could not be distinguished from any category of protected speech 
in its capacity to provide the public with information that is relevant both to people’s 
personal lives and to their political decisions or in any other constitutionally relevant 
dimension.6 Redish’s argument quite explicitly, as does marketplace of ideas theory 
more generally, took the perspective of the audience for the speech. Here, the 
relevance of its content to them was the crucial concern. It should also be noted that as 
of the early 1970s, with the exception of Emerson’s broader four-function theory, 
virtually all First Amendment scholarship and the dominant doctrinal formulations 
accepted some version of a marketplace of ideas theory.7 
Then in 1976, a case came before the Court involving a statute that prohibited 
pharmacists from advertising the price of prescription drugs.8 Clarifying a decision 
from the year before that protected as free speech an advertisement for abortion 
services, the Court established the modern view that the First Amendment protects 
commercial speech. The Court’s reasoning, clearly adopting a marketplace of ideas 
theory that emphasized the informative value of commercial speech to its audience, 
offered arguments that duplicated those that Redish had advanced several years before. 
The Court did suggest, however, that regulations of commercial speech were likely 
constitutionally justifiable if the commercial speech were false or misleading (imagine 
the silence of politicians that would follow if law prohibited misleading political 
huckstering); if the advertising were for an illegal product or transaction (although the 
Court fully protects advocacy of law violation under the First Amendment); or if the 
regulation related to the time, place, and manner of commercial speech. The Court 
                                                                                                                 
 
 3. Id. at 54. 
 4. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 5. See THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION (1970); ALEXANDER 
MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948), reprinted in 
POLITICAL FREEDOM 3 (1965). 
 6. See Martin H. Redish, The First Amendment in the Marketplace: Commercial Speech 
and the Values of Free Expression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 429 (1971). 
 7. See, e.g., C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 6–25 (1989). 
 8. See Va. Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976). 
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stated that general First Amendment rules against prior restraints (e.g., pre-approval 
schemes) may not apply, and requirements that advertisements include warning or 
other informational content apparently would be permitted. In protecting commercial 
speech, however, the Court clearly concluded that commercial advertising can serve all 
the purposes related to informing audiences that other protected speech performs. 
Virginia Board remained the lead case until the Supreme Court purported to 
summarize the law and established the current, though much criticized, four-part 
doctrinal test in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of 
New York.9 This balancing test indicated that the state could regulate commercial 
speech, not only when the commercial speech would be excluded from First 
Amendment protection under Virginia Board (for example, because the speech was 
false or misleading or because it promoted a product whose sale was itself illegal), but 
also if the state’s interest was substantial, if the regulation directly advanced the 
interest, and if the regulation was no more extensive than necessary to advance it. In 
Central Hudson, New York, in pursuit of an environmental interest in preventing 
excess energy use, had barred a broad range of electric utility companies’ advertising. 
Although the Court invalidated the regulation, noting for example that the law 
prevented advertisements that advised consumers to shift their electric usage to place 
less demand on the system or to purchase energy-saving devices, the Court indicated 
that it would uphold a ban if it only prohibited advertising that promoted behavior that 
contradicted the state’s conservation objectives.10 
Ever since Virginia Board, both before and after Central Hudson, the Court has 
swung back and forth between weaker and stronger protection of commercial speech. 
As of 2007, though, the trend is apparently toward being more protective. Although the 
judiciary is usually quite deferential to the government’s characterization of its interest 
as serious, that is, a “substantial” interest, the Central Hudson test gives courts 
considerable leeway in determining whether the law directly advances the state’s 
purported interest and whether the regulation is more extensive than necessary. 
Sometimes invalidation seems merely to reflect a law’s apparent sheer stupidity in 
relation to its announced purpose. For example, who would think that to advance an 
interest in preventing children from smoking or even the more attenuated interest in 
avoiding their exposure to advertising for tobacco products, a requirement that ads in 
stores be placed over five feet above the store floor effectively advance the interest? 11 
Did Massachusetts believe its young people always hung their heads and looked at the 
ground? This is not to say that the Court has not also struck down much more plausible 
regulations. The point here is that the Central Hudson test usually gives courts plenty 
of room to maneuver. 
Beyond its manipulability, the primary criticism of the Central Hudson test is that it 
apparently authorizes what critics identify as paternalism, an approach that had 
arguably been repudiated in the initial case of Virginia Board. Under Central Hudson, 
if the state has a substantial interest in preventing some legal behavior, it purportedly 
can “paternalistically” prevent people from receiving argument or information that 
promotes the behavior, such as advertisements promoting increased electrical usage.12 
                                                                                                                 
 
 9. 447 U.S. 557 (1980). 
 10. See id. at 569–71. 
 11. See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001). 
 12. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563–64; cf. Daniel Hays Lowenstein, “Too Much 
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Nevertheless, it should be—but almost never is—noted that this assertion of 
paternalism is not quite right. As Justice Rehnquist first pointed out in his Virginia 
Board dissent, regulations of commercial speech are never blanket prohibitions on 
provision of any category of information or argument. They are not inartful attempts to 
keep people ignorant by preventing them from receiving information. Rather, they are 
direct efforts to prevent or regulate the participation of certain speakers in a 
discourse.13 The regulations always apply only to a specified class of commercial 
speakers.14 For example, the regulations at issue in Virginia Board only prohibited 
pharmacists from advertising their drug prices—the press, public interest 
organizations, and individuals were left free to publicize this information to the extent 
they chose to do so. A regulation of a tobacco company’s advertising does not prohibit 
people from telling their friends that smoking is sexy, safe, fun, or any other stupid and 
harmful opinion they want to offer. The law does not impede freedom of private or 
pubic discourse among people and in the press. Similarly, legislation barring corporate 
entities from placing political advertisements promoting their preferred candidate for 
public office does not paternalistically bar people from expressing or hearing content 
favoring or opposing particular candidates, but only restricts the public discourse to 
speakers other than non-media commercial entities. The paternalism, if it is to be called 
that, is about limiting participation in a particular communication sphere or particular 
debate to non-commercial agents and to the press. Discourse in the press and among all 
citizens and non-commercial associations is unrestrained. Still, some Justices, most 
prominently Justice Thomas, have made the factually false claim concerning 
paternalism—that the aim of regulating commercial speech is to “keep[]people 
ignorant by suppressing expression,”15 as well as indicating impatience with any 
constitutional distinction between commercial speech and other speech. 
There is much more to be said about the current state of doctrine and scholarly 
debates. For the last thirty years, commercial speech has been one of the most prolific 
subjects of both Supreme Court decisions and scholarly commentary in the free speech 
area—though I might add that this prominence is hardly accidental or due solely to the 
intrinsic interest of the subject. Not only do corporate interests bring almost all the 
litigation, finding it possibly the most potent constitutional ground for invalidating 
governmental economic regulation since the demise of Lochner in 1937,16 but these 
corporate interests have also paid for many of the conferences and many of the papers 
that initiated and sustained interest in the subject. I will put these debates aside. 
Instead, I outline three separate arguments, each of which I accept as adequate in itself, 
                                                                                                                 
Puff”: Persuasion, Paternalism, and Commercial Speech, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 1205, 1238 
(1988).  
 13.  See Va. State Bd. of Pharm., 425 U.S. at 782–83 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 14. The one arguable exception to the claim in the text was a federal rule that prohibited (in 
the case of broadcasters in states that barred lotteries) the broadcast of information about 
lotteries. The law would appear to apply to a broadcast station, for example in its news program, 
from listing the winning numbers of the state lottery in a neighboring state. The Court, however, 
found the law inapplicable to this type of situation by interpreting it to apply only to 
advertisements, not news, about the lottery, thus following the distinction offered in the text 
above. United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418 (1993). 
 15. Lorillard Tobacco, 533 U.S. at 575 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 16. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), overruled by W. Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 
300 U.S. 379 (1937). 
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and then favorably mention one more for denying all First Amendment protection for 
the speech of profit-oriented enterprises—a category that includes what has been 
described as commercial speech. 
 
II. REASONS TO DENY PROTECTION 
I have long advanced a strongly libertarian interpretation of the First Amendment 
freedom of speech: it should protect an individual’s meaningfully expressive behavior, 
including speech.17 An adequate premise for this view is the notion that the legitimacy 
of legal order requires that the government respect individual autonomy. In addition, I 
argue that this respect for people’s autonomy, plus respect for people’s fundamental 
equality, provides the basic normative rationale for democracy. Respect for people’s 
autonomy, for a person’s choices about herself, explains why the government must not 
aim to restrain a person’s speech. Unlike the marketplace of ideas theory, this 
interpretation of free speech relates most overtly to the speaker—she gets to choose 
what she wants to say—although indirectly it also provides for the autonomy of the 
listener in that the law must not stop her from trying to hear anything that someone else 
has a right to and chooses to say to her. Moreover, unlike the purely instrumental value 
of speech in a marketplace search for truth (an instrumental value that is arguably often 
better advanced by intelligent regulation than by anarchy in a speech agora), this 
argument is basically non-instrumental in nature. The question here is what the 
implications of this view are for the commercial sphere. 
 
A. Autonomy and Market Dictates 
Max Weber describes modernity as crucially involving the separation of the 
economy from the household.18 His iron cage of rationalization pictures the modern 
market as effectively dictating to all participants that they adopt the most efficient 
behavior. In this view, a firm has no freedom except to adopt ever more profitable 
techniques. Since any commercial entity must reproduce its capital to continue, it must 
meet any efficiency challenge generated by a competitor—failure to do so causes 
bankruptcy to loom. At least as long as markets are fully competitive, real freedom of 
choice exists only in the non-rationalized realms such as the household or politics, not 
in the efficient behavior of market participants. This, of course, does not deny that 
individuals lucky enough to have various employment options do have choices—
because they are individuals rather than capital-reproducing entities, the market does 
not force them to seek the most profitable employment. Their employers, though, and 
the individual employee once having taken the job, must behave so or the employer’s 
capital and the employees’ jobs are put at risk. The simplest example is a tobacco or 
whiskey company. Even if the stockholders, board of directors, top management, 
marketing personnel, and other employees all believe that smoking or drinking is bad 
for one’s health and should be avoided, the company’s continuance depends on its 
speech effectively promoting the profitable sale of its products. On pain of losing out 
                                                                                                                 
 
 17. See BAKER, supra note 7. 
 18. See generally MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich 
eds., 1968). 
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to its competitors, if the company’s expression fails at this, it ceases as a business 
enterprise. 
The observation that freedom does not exist in the market turns out to be a point on 
which conservative free market economists—in the United States, the Chicago School 
types—agree with Marxists, who critique not so much the capitalists but capitalism. 
The main difference is that the free market economists see the market as dictating what 
they describe as efficiency but what the Marxists describe as alienation. Both, however, 
argue that the market dictates profit-maximizing (purportedly efficient) behavior and, 
presumably, dictates speech that the firm believes most advances that goal. 
Three of the dissenters in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,19 a case 
invalidating a state law banning corporate expenditures that promote the corporation’s 
views relating to a ballot measure, saw this point in explaining why they would deny 
protection to corporate political speech: 
[W]hat some have considered to be the principal function of the First Amendment, 
the use of communication as a means of self-expression, self-realization, and self-
fulfillment, is not at all furthered by corporate speech. It is clear that the 
communications of profitmaking corporations . . . do not represent a manifestation 
of individual freedom or choice.20 
Though a dissent then, these views later carried the day in a similar case, Austin v. 
Michigan State Chamber of Commerce,21 which upheld a ban on corporate 
expenditures promoting candidates for office, and they currently provide the rationale 
for largely denying constitutional protection to corporate political speech.22 My claim 
is that this feature of not manifesting individual freedom is a proper reason to deny 
First Amendment protection for commercial speech. 
Three important observations—one about history, one about application, and one 
about structures—concerning this argument for denying protection to the speech of 
market enterprises should be noted. The argument assumes the existence of the largely 
competitive market that economists widely observe and Marxists describe. Weber saw 
this market realm as central to the modern process of rationalization. Jürgen Habermas 
sees it as creating a systems realm on which modern society relies in order to relieve 
coordination problems that would become unmanageable for a complex modern 
society if left to communicative practices of what he describes as the lifeworld.23 Much 
law assumes this division between the market enterprise and the lifeworld. Tax codes, 
for example, purport to be able to distinguish business expenses and personal 
expenditures. Business expenses are viewed as a necessary cost, created by market 
demand, and thus, deserving of a tax deduction. In contrast, personal expenditures are 
viewed as a reflection of personal values and individual needs, and thus, undeserving 
of a deduction. In the United States, corporate law often imposes duties on boards or 
                                                                                                                 
 
 19. 435 U.S. 765, 802 (1978) (White, J., dissenting). 
 20. Id. at 804–05. 
 21. 494 U.S. 652 (1990). 
 22. McConnell v. Fed. Elections Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003). But cf. Fed. Elections 
Comm’n v. Wis. Right to Life, 127 S. Ct. 2652 (2007). 
 23. See, e.g., 2 JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION: LIFEWORLD 
AND SYSTEM: A CRITIQUE OF FUNCTIONALIST REASON (Thomas McCarthy trans., 1987). 
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management to be oriented toward profitability for the ultimate benefit of equity 
holders. Nevertheless, this market realm is explicitly historical, and if the economic 
order were structured differently, this argument would not justify denying protection to 
commercial speech. 
In addition to the argument being historically bound, it must recognize “slippage.” 
The real world diverges in varying degrees from the world of market determination 
described here. Sometimes monopolistic circumstances allow management to spend 
potential profits and sometimes workers or other stake-holders will be willing and able 
to accept lower wages or interest rates essentially to subsidize practices that embody 
ideals other than market-demanded economic efficiency. Nothing said here commits 
First Amendment theory to how it should respond to this slippage away from market-
demanded efficiency. In fact, one commentator has raised the question of whether, if 
our ethical ideals for economic life and economic organization diverge from the model 
described here, constitutional principles should assume this existing order, or instead, 
should in some way reflect or protect this ethical alternative.24 
Finally, the specifically structural orientation of this analysis must be emphasized. 
The observation is commonplace that a person’s circumstances or context influences (a 
social scientist might claim causes or determines) her speech. Certainly, the electoral 
context strongly influences many candidates to compete by saying what they believe 
will result in electoral victory. Nevertheless, the candidate can choose to express her 
true values and make the arguments that she believes. The ideal of the political realm—
the ideal of when it operates properly—and an ideal of much of life in both the public 
and private portions of the lifeworld view people as having freedom to, and as properly 
choosing to, express their real values and allegiances. This attributed freedom reflects a 
structural view that characterizes expenditures in these realms as value-based 
consumption rather than inherent attempts at reproducing capital. In contrast, the 
structural ideal of a modern commercial market—the market sphere when it works 
properly—is precisely to dictate an instrumental orientation toward efficiency and 
profit, the behavior that economists like to say leads to placing resources in their 
highest and best uses (at least, purportedly does so given the market measure of value). 
For this reason, attributing potential freedom to the actor is not appropriate in the 
market sphere but is appropriate elsewhere. Both attributions of lack of freedom in one 
and freedom in the other represent the ideal characterizations of their respective 
spheres. Thus, regulation of commercial speech does not, but regulation of speech in 
other arenas does, deny the respect for the autonomy that the state must attribute to 
people. 
 
B. Speech of Artificial, Instrumentally Justified Entities 
Business enterprises in general—commercial corporations even more obviously—
are legal entities created for essentially instrumental reasons. These entities allow the 
economy to operate effectively in the modern world. Despite being vitally important, 
their merely instrumental rationale leaves them with a morally different status than 
living, flesh-and-blood people—the people who Kant argues must be valued as ends 
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and whose ultimate value a legitimate state must respect.25 This difference certainly 
explains why, under any theory centered on the moral importance of individual liberty 
(the formal right to make, stupidly or wisely, choices about oneself), individuals’ right 
to make speech choices has constitutional status while these entities’ rights do not. 
Of course, people make up commercial entities’ animating parts, but the status of 
people’s acts within these structures—and the rights and obligations, even the 
existence of these entities—is ultimately determined by law. People within the legal 
framework of these entities act as an element of the entity, but they always also leave 
these roles at times and act in the lifeworld, the household, and the public sphere, 
where they make choices as individuals. The law constantly treats a person’s acts that it 
attributes to the commercial entity differently than acts within the rest of a person’s 
life. Tax law, for example, must allow deductions for business expenses in order to 
make income taxes on businesses coherent, while for individuals the law sensibly taxes 
all income (not revenue minus expenses). Essentially, for instrumental reasons of 
efficiency, these artificial entities are given potentially perpetual life, but when it 
becomes socially useful to put any one of them “to death,” the law does so with 
dispatch without creating any moral qualms that the death penalty famously raises for 
flesh-and-blood people. 
This last point about the death penalty can be generalized. Moral and political 
theory simply does not demand that the state respect the business entity’s autonomy or 
its liberty; rather, normative theory demands that the state design these entities—give 
them existence, rights, and obligations—in a manner crafted to serve societal interests. 
Given business enterprises’ artificial nature and instrumental justification, the law 
should regulate them to serve flesh-and-blood people, not equate them in regard to 
rights with real people nor allow them to dominate people. For example, though 
respect for autonomy should disable majorities from excluding particular people from 
public discourses or from barring people’s expression of particular views in their 
public or private discourses—we call such limitations censorship—this required 
respect for the individual is not offended by shutting out or regulating the extent and 
form of participation by these artificial entities. 
Importantly, the vulnerability of a commercial entity to regulation of its speech 
never leaves the individual, the constitutionally and morally valued agent, unfree. Part 
of an individual’s nature is that even though she plays roles within the commercial 
realm, she always leaves that context at points; whenever she does, she is entirely free 
to speak as she will. The law often draws these lines—determining whether to attribute 
speech (or other activities, for example, tortious acts on which to premise liability) to 
the corporation on the basis of factors such as whether the speaker was charging 
expenses to the corporation, taking business expense deductions for these expenses, or 
being paid for her time related to the speech. 
Some commentators rightly observe that regulation of these artificial entities 
disfavors certain views—those otherwise promoted by the market. But the legal order 
always favors or disfavors various views, most obviously by how it distributes wealth 
or spends tax money on its own expression. With no natural baseline, it is difficult to 
see why conscious efforts to improve existing baselines of expressive influence, as long 
                                                                                                                 
 
 25. See IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON (Thomas Kingsmill Abbott 
trans., Dover Publ’ns 2004) (1788); cf. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). 
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as using means consistent with respecting people’s autonomy, are problematic. 
Everyone is left free to argue her own position on her own with whatever resources she 
is able to muster. In passing, I note a ubiquitous argument often presented to me in 
conversation, most persistently by Martin Redish. By regulating commercial speech on 
a particular subject, it is argued, the law biases debate. When a view is so wrong-
headed that no real individuals would advance it, regulation of commercial speech will 
sometimes prevent speech from the only source that will present a particular view in a 
serious, sustained manner. Putting aside the empirical truth of this claim (for example, 
whether instead a teenager’s peer will actually be the most powerful advocate of 
smoking cigarettes), the answer is twofold. First, there is little obvious baseline to 
establish when the debate is unbiased. Different communications occur depending on 
how the law determines distribution of income or communicative power. If there is to 
be a proper baseline, the most obvious possibility is for it to reflect lack of restraint on 
individuals to say what they want when speaking for themselves or, more radically, it is 
proper only if all individuals have equal resources to commit to their expression. This 
leads to the second response to the possibility of mandating silence by these entities: 
“so what?” If no real flesh-and-blood person subscribes to the merits of a particular 
viewpoint, the concept of freedom provides no reason for creating a “flat earth society” 
that makes money by trying to persuade people to adopt particular beliefs. 
In the United States, the Supreme Court repudiated the so-called Lochner era, which 
typically found that business regulation unconstitutionally infringed on individual 
liberty. Historically, this change occurred roughly simultaneously with the beginning of 
vigorous protection of speech freedom. An obvious explanation would be that the 
Court saw constitutional liberty as essentially a matter for individuals operating outside 
the commercial sphere while viewing commercial entities more instrumentally. Justice 
Rehnquist was a modern Justice who often reasoned in a manner similar to Justice 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, a leading proponent of repudiating Lochner. Thus, it is not 
surprising that Rehnquist should offer precisely this argument in his persistent 
opposition to protecting commercial speech. In his dissent in Virginia Board, for 
example, Rehnquist quoted the statement in the anti-Lochner case, Williamson v. Lee 
Optical Co.,26 which upheld a state prohibition on advertisements for eyeglass frames. 
There the Court stated: “We see no constitutional reason why a State may not treat all 
who deal with the human eye as members of a profession who should use no 
merchandising methods for obtaining customers.”27 In a later dissent outlining 
essentially the same argument given here for denying speech rights to business 
corporations, Rehnquist went back even further. He quoted Chief Justice John 
Marshall’s description of “the status of a corporation in the eyes of federal law”: 
A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in 
contemplation of law. Being the mere creature of law, it possesses only those 
properties which the charter of creation confers upon it, either expressly, or as 
incidental to its very existence. These are such as are supposed best calculated to 
effect the object for which it was created.28 
                                                                                                                 
 
 26. 348 U.S. 483 (1955). 
 27. Va. State Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 784 (1976) 
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 28. First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 823 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., 
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Rehnquist made the important follow-up point that the law only restricts corporate 
participation in public discourse but does not prevent communications by people who 
have liberty interests in their speech.29 Thus, in Virginia Board he pointed out that the 
statute “only forbids pharmacists to publish this price information. There is no 
prohibition against a consumer group . . . collecting and publishing comparative price 
information as to various pharmacies in an area.”30 In his Belloti dissent, where he 
argued in favor of accepting the broad consensus among most state governments and 
the federal government that corporate speech aimed at the political process should be 
restricted, Rehnquist likewise observed that “all natural persons, who owe their 
existence to a higher sovereign than the Commonwealth, remain as free as before to 
engage in political activity.”31 
The argument is, therefore, that respect for individual autonomy does not require 
protecting the speech of artificially created and instrumentally valued commercial 
entities. Mention should be made, however, to an important caveat to this conclusion 
that answers an obvious objection. The press—the mass media—is often described as 
having one foot in the commercial realm and the other in the democratic public sphere. 
This is not the place to treat the constitutional protection of a free press systematically, 
but the structural point about the merely instrumental significance of corporate entities 
continues to apply. Unlike the rationale for speech freedom, the best rationale for press 
freedom relates to the instrumental purpose or point of these entities—to produce 
information and vision independent of governmental or legal direction—which 
distinguishes their product from that of other businesses. Though of merely 
instrumental value, this value, especially including the quality of independence, is 
absolutely crucial for a free and democratic society. The point is not that the value of 
press freedom is other than instrumental but that this instrumental value, unlike that of 
the rest of the commercial sphere, lies precisely in its speech being free of censorious 
regulation—and on this ground it is the one business with an explicit constitutional 
status.32 
 
C. Power Versus Liberty 
A person exercises autonomy most fundamentally by embodying her values in her 
actions or chosen inactions. A plausible (roughly libertarian) political theory argues 
that the law should presumptively permit (and possibly that a constitution should 
protect) these exercises of autonomy when they do not physically restrict another’s use 
of her body or property in her actions or otherwise exercise power over her. A person’s 
basic autonomy rights should include her own self-expression, engaging with others in 
solidarity, or achieving aims by persuasion of others. In contrast, one person’s 
constitutionally protected autonomy should not include exercising power over other 
people. Many exercises of power should be allowed, but only when they contribute to a 
better—fairer, more efficient, or otherwise collectively chosen—society. 
                                                                                                                 
dissenting) (quoting Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 250, 303 (1819)). 
 29.  See id. at 827–28. 
 30. Va. State Bd. of Pharm., 425 U.S. at 782 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
 31. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 828 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 32. See Potter Stewart, Or of the Press, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631 (1975). 
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A person’s speech choices constitute an integral aspect of this autonomy, especially 
when she is using her speech to express her values or to change the world to 
correspond more to what she values. This is true, in any event, as long as she respects 
the other’s autonomy in the sense that the other is not only free to reject her expressive 
claims, but also to follow her expressive lead by representing his acceptance of her 
leadership, or the values or facts that she honestly asserts. The speaker respects the 
other’s autonomy when, as is typically true, the speaker leaves the other with this 
possibility of choice as to what they want or believe—what Rawls calls consensus as 
opposed to modus vivende, or what Habermas calls communicative agreement.33 This 
case should be contrasted with a second case where the speaker instrumentally uses lies 
or power to get the other to act in a manner she recognizes is likely to be contrary to 
his values. In the first case, the speaker relies not on law, deception, or force but only 
on her own insight as embodied in her expression to create solidarity with her audience 
and, thereby, often to change the world to her liking. A person’s own use of property, 
even though it is her property only due to law, within her own activities to embody or 
express her values likewise is an aspect of her autonomy. This autonomy aspect of her 
use of property applies likewise to its use within joint solidaristic activities with others 
where each party values both her and the other’s activity. 
The question here is whether this autonomy encompasses changing the world 
through voluntary market exchanges. Two claims are defended below. First, the typical 
speech situation involves an attempt at persuasion—to create a solidarity—while the 
typical offer of a market transaction is an attempt to exercise power (in an instrumental 
effort to rearrange resources) without solidarity, that is, without the transferor 
substantively valuing the transferee getting what transferee wants, and vice versa. More 
money is not a better argument. It is more power. Second, though society often benefits 
from market transactions (as well as many other exercises of power), exercises of 
power of one person over another should be subject to collective regulation while 
exercises of persuasion and creation of solidarities almost never should be.34 
In many quarters, the first point will be most the controversial. The typical 
description of a market exchange is that it is (or at least should be) voluntary, with both 
parties wanting to participate, and that the exchange makes both better off than they 
were before. Those points I largely accept. Still, my claim is that, phenomenologically 
and structurally, market transactions are mutual exercises of power of one over 
another. When B offers S one dollar in exchange for S’s apple pie (Americans are fond 
of apple pies), B seeks to get S to do something. The same is true when B tells S that 
she may shoot S in the head but offers not to if S gives her the pie. In each case, S does 
not substantively want B to have the pie but transfers it to B, if she does, because of the 
value S places on B’s “offer.” Of course, if S really does value B’s having the pie, even 
if the law prohibited S’s exercise of power (that is, prohibited S’s offer to pay or not to 
                                                                                                                 
 
 33. See generally JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A 
DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY (William Rehg trans.,1996); JOHN RAWLS, 
POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993). 
 34. I should note that the term “persuasion” here is actually somewhat distortive of the vast 
range of communicative uses of speech that receive constitutional protection, but at least in most 
cases, any harm or benefit that results from the protected speech involves the listener’s mental 
assimilation and then her agreement, disagreement, appreciation, or other reaction to the 
message. 
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shoot), S is normally free to give B the pie. And, of course, it works both ways—B can 
charitably or loyally give S money and can peacefully avoid mayhem. S’s possession of 
the pie gave S the capacity to exercise power over B—to get B to pay one dollar or 
keep B from shooting. In each case, absent B’s exercise of power, S would prefer to 
keep her pie. S treats her pie in this context purely instrumentally—just as B similarly 
treats her money or gun—while she values it expressively when she shares it with B. 
The pie leads to something S wants: the dollar or not being shot. The only difference—
though, of course, noteworthy—is that B normally has a right to transfer the dollar, but 
normally no right to shoot (or threaten to shoot). Or, from the other side, normally S 
already had a right not to be shot while normally no right to the dollar in B’s pocket. 
The question is the significance of that difference. Ultimately, the difference is not 
whether S had a choice. If S desperately needed B’s dollar to buy a life saving drug, 
even if pies normally sell for two dollars (but with these purchasers now being nowhere 
around), S may experience herself as having no choice but to sell to B for one dollar. If 
the pie is part of a sacrament in S’s religion but B’s gorging himself would defile that 
religion, S may think she has a choice when B puts the gun to her head, deciding to 
take the chance of surviving B’s gunshot (and in any event getting to heaven even if B 
shoots). Most importantly for my purposes, in both cases, when S transfers possession, 
structurally there is no indication that S values B having the pie. Of course, if S is in the 
pie business, S wants customers, but often S would be even happier if the customers 
simply came and gave S their money without demanding pies in return. Central is that, 
in both cases, structurally the interaction only need assume, and often only involves, 
instrumental calculations of the two parties. B uses his purported ownership of the 
dollar or gun plus trigger hand and S uses her ownership of the pie to get what is 
desired, given that the other person will not provide it otherwise. In this fact—the 
instrumental use of what she controls to get the other to do what the other otherwise 
would not want to do—lies the structural exercise or attempted exercise of power. 
Of course, for moral or pragmatic reasons lawmakers conclude some exercises of 
power are undesirable and others are desirable—market transactions often (but 
certainly not always) lead to efficient, socially desirable allocation of resources. Even 
when market transactions are not ideal, legal policies other than barring the transaction 
often provide the better response. In other cases, however, the law bars this exchange 
use of property, this exercise of power. It does, for example, in respect to how you vote 
in elections—you can “give me” but not sell me your vote. And the post-Lochner era 
of economic regulations shows that often societies conclude that a transaction (that 
does not meet certain conditions) is not desirable and prohibits this exchange-use of 
property (usually, on one side, prohibits this exchange-use of money) just as it 
prohibits the use of the gun to make a threat. The difference between the situations is 
not the forcefulness of the demand or offer. It is neither the voluntariness of the 
response nor its beneficial outcome. Rather, the difference, if there is one, lies in the 
law. Some exercises of power the legal policy considers desirable to allow, others not. 
Despite exceptions, the law (and morality) seldom considers the power that comes 
from guns a form of power desirable to promote domestically. Still, though generally 
gun use is considered excessive, under appropriate additional circumstances, some 
American states have allowed B to shoot S if S is on B’s property without permission 
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and if she first “offers” S the option of leaving.35 In contrast, the law—and most but not 
all ethical views—considers most market exercises of power desirable to allow, though 
sometimes not and it is always a policy matter to identify when it is not. But 
structurally, except for this common legal difference, the market and weapon actions 
both exercise power where the party initiating the transaction treats what she is capable 
of offering (or threatening) purely instrumentally. 
I should note that this is not a critique of property. Property consists of many 
separate rights, the normative significance of which and the legal, constitutional, and 
moral treatment of which vary.36 Most obvious for the present discussion is the 
difference between exchange value and use value. The first involves situations where, 
at least structurally, the owner treats the property simply instrumentally—to exercise 
power over another. The second includes many situations where the owner integrates 
the property into her substantively valued activities and chosen life. This distinction 
even applies to ways of transferring ownership. In most cases where law forbids market 
exchanges, it permits transfers of the same items by means of gift, a gift being a use 
that expresses solidarity or other substantive values.37 My most iconoclastic claim is 
probably my view that libertarians have been ideologically tricked into identifying the 
notion of liberty or autonomy with the first category of property rights. Rather, their 
plausible claim should go no further than to emphasize the need for careful explanation 
of any limits on a person’s use of her property within her own substantively valued 
practices. That is, any plausible libertarian claim should relate to property’s use value, 
not its exchange value. And, of course, the initial questions of where to recognize 
private property and how to allocate it logically must represent collective choices—the 
specific legitimacy of these choices ought to be evaluated on the basis of principles of 
justice as well as in terms of their contribution to various collective visions of the good. 
As an illustration of the claim here, compare five forms of interaction: persuading, 
cooperating, giving, trading, and stealing. In the first three, there is no structural reason 
not to think both parties substantively value both their own and the other’s conclusions 
or resulting circumstances. They express (or may express) solidarity and association. In 
contrast to giving, in trading a person need not value in itself the other’s consequent 
possession of what was formally her property. She only values the result—that she now 
has something the other previously had. Trading may create an association, but one 
only necessarily valued instrumentally—though, of course, this observation does not 
deny that a person can substantively value her life as a trader (just as she can 
substantively value her life as a thief) and have real concern for her customers. The 
claim is only that this affirmative valuation of the other’s situation is not essential to 
the structure of “trading” while “giving” creates a form of association whose essential 
quality expresses a form of solidarity or other substantive values. The giver values the 
other being better off—at least, better off as she the giver sees it. 
There is an important parallel to the way speech operates. In persuasion, a speaker 
willingly offers, as a “gift,” her own wisdom, knowledge, or vision. Even when the 
speaker communicates invective or with a wish to demoralize the other—to insult, for 
                                                                                                                 
 
 35. See, e.g., Vann v. State, 64 S.W. 243, 247 (Tex. 1900). 
 36. See C. Edwin Baker, Property and Its Relation to Constitutionally Protected Liberty, 
134 U. PA. L. REV. 741, 742–74 (1986). 
 37. See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979) (noting that there is no taking where the law 
allows a person to possess, give, or devise, but not to sell the artifact). 
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example—she offers information or vision that she wants the other to have. In contrast, 
unlike with the gift that the speaker willingly transfers, trading or effectively coercive 
demands result in a person transferring something with which she would prefer not to 
part in order to obtain something she desires. Thus, the autonomy or liberty that is a 
central justification of speech freedom in many ways parallels the freedom to make 
gifts but is not involved in either market transactions or theft, both of which involve 
exercises of power and should be justified or rejected on pragmatic grounds other than 
a formal interest in autonomy. 
The only further step in this argument is to note that commercial speech is a practice 
integrally involved in the aim of consummating profitable market transactions. As 
such, it should be subject to regulation on the same basis as any other aspect of this 
process. Just like market exchanges themselves, commercial speech is often socially 
useful and thus, on pragmatic grounds, should often be allowed. But when commercial 
speech impedes any social aim, the law should prohibit or regulate it to remove 
dysfunctional aspects or to generate more functional aspects. These points are probably 
why Thomas Emerson, the greatest American First Amendment absolutist (who 
proposed what he called a “full protection” approach), viewed commercial speech 
entirely outside the system of freedom of expression and instead a part of the system of 
commerce.38 It is likewise closely related to why John Stuart Mill, despite his adamant 
defense of speech freedom, did not think his argument applied to speech promoting 
commercial exchanges, speech which could be properly restricted even if the law 
properly allows the practice that the speech seeks to promote.39 
 
D. Dissent 
Steve Shiffrin has argued that “dissent” ought to be the ruling image of free speech 
in America.40 Shiffrin grounds his argument in American history and its romantic 
literary tradition, as well as pragmatic arguments concerning an effectively functioning 
democracy. In particular, society will better identify and respond to injustices (as well 
as simply incompetences) if it encourages rather than suppresses dissent.41 Even if one 
accepts an autonomy or liberty theory as the underlying normative rationale of speech 
freedom, as a practical matter, autonomy or liberty is seldom threatened except when 
embodied in dissent. Thus, dissent is what needs protection. Shiffrin’s conclusions, as 
well as his pragmatic observations, ring largely true. 
Shiffrin observes that his romantic or reformist vision of dissent is seldom an 
attribute of commercial speech—certainly in contexts where regulation has been 
fought. The billions of dollars commercial firms commit to advertising, with its 
typically mainstream values, overwhelmingly swamp opposing views supported by the 
typically tight budgets of those activist groups able to even muster a budget. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 38. See EMERSON, supra note 5. 
 39. See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 163–87 (Gertrude Himmelfarb, ed., Pelican 
Classics 1974) (1859). 
 40. STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, DISSENT, INJUSTICE, AND THE MEANINGS OF AMERICA (1999); 
STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY, AND ROMANCE (1990). 
 41. Aspects of Thomas Emerson’s fourth function of free speech, to create a balance 
between stability and change, are implicit in Shiffrin’s discussion of dissent. See EMERSON, 
supra note 5. 
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Commercial advertisers’ speech typically exploits, extends, or defends the status quo, 
in this regard consistently diverging from activist dissenters’ typically critical stances 
toward the status quo. Thus, commercial speech seldom provides any analogy to the 
dissent that Shiffrin argues merits protection. What commercial speech puts in play is 
not dissent but unregulated power. Rhetorically, it could be claimed that “regulated” 
commercial speech dissents precisely to the majoritarian views justifying regulation. 
This definitional trick seems quite disingenuous. Except for the fact of regulation, few 
would identify as citizen-based dissent the tobacco companies’ promotion of their 
cigarettes, the liquor companies’ promotion of their products, the fast food chains’ 
promotion of their unhealthy food, or the pharmaceutical companies’ promotion of 
their drugs. Occasional attempts to rein in powerful economic forces should not be 
mistaken for regulation of dissent. In sum, Shiffrin’s dissent-based theory provides a 
reason to typically reject constitutional protection of commercial speech. 
Shiffrin’s dissent theory can be seen as a critique of the theories offered above. He 
regularly emphasizes “thinking small,” or thinking contextually.42 He invokes Isaiah 
Berlin’s admonition to think like a fox, not like a hedgehog. A pragmatic contextualist, 
Shiffrin consistently resists sweeping abstract principles of the sort offered in the first 
three arguments above. Even if commercial speech typically should not be protected, at 
times it does represent dissent. Consider the speech of an artisan commune that self-
consciously seeks to challenge capitalist production. Or consider the speech of organic 
farmers who seek to integrate both work and environmental practices and to embody a 
vision not of profitability but of human stewardship. This commune may then wish to 
advertise (or not support governmentally compelled advertising) precisely to promote 
this vision of the world and to create solidarity with customers in expressing this 
vision. One question is whether, in these cases, the dissent theory and the other 
approaches to commercial speech developed above lead to different conclusions. 
Of course, my first argument about market determination was explicitly 
contextual—it claimed to be historically grounded and to reflect the dominating 
structure of our market economy. The possibility of these dissenting commercial 
practices exists only to the extent that—or in contexts where—people are able to and 
do take advantage of this structure not having total dominance. Some of these 
“dissenting” commercial practices are possible precisely due to contexts where workers 
are able, in a sense, to subsidize their economic practice by accepting lower wages. 
From a Weberian perspective, they have reintegrated the household and economic 
spheres. Where this provides the best description of the speech situation, my first 
argument justifying regulation does not apply to this speech. 
Seana Shiffrin recently employed similar examples to suggest something like the 
following: Grant that collective choice, represented by government power, has proper 
sway over the structure of the economic realm. When this government power is not 
exercised, it largely leaves this realm to the amoral (not immoral, but specifically 
amoral) market.43 Speech regulation in these contexts can rely on collective value 
choices to temper the dominance or other consequences of this amoralism. When the 
economic sphere is not pervasively regulated on the basis of collective choice, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 42. Steven H. Shiffrin, The First Amendment and Economic Regulation: Away from a 
General Theory of the First Amendment, 78 NW. U. L. REV. 1212, 1214 (1984). 
 43. See Shiffrin, supra note 24. 
996 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 84:981 
 
however, First Amendment commitments should protect those who are able 
individually or associatively to struggle against the market’s amoralism by embodying 
non-market substantive values into their practices. They may aim to create solidarities 
with others in society and to create an ethical alternative to the amoralism of the 
market. Sometimes (not always) applying commercial speech regulations would require 
these actors to contradict their non-market values. This application is problematic both 
from the perspective of the rationale of government regulation—which is to respond to 
market amorality—and from the perspective of the autonomy (specifically the 
opportunity to dissent and try to create alternative practices) that the First Amendment 
protects. Of course, if the self-proclaimed dissenting economic actors are merely 
seeking to escape regulation in order to take advantage of amoral market incentives, 
they hardly have any right to free ride. They have no claim to opt out just because, in 
other respects, their allegiance is to other normative (or sometimes religious) values. 
To justify opting out, the regulatory requirements must specifically contradict the value 
integration that makes their practice dissenting. This analysis emphasizes that 
constitutional norms are misapplied when they contradict the moral ideals they are 
designed to embody. Even if in the routine case these moral ideals are part of the 
justification of government authority over amoral markets, when people themselves 
struggle specifically against market amoralism, these constitutional ideas should flip 
into offering protection of their practices. 
In some respects, this argument parallels one made in respect to the First 
Amendment protecting the anonymity of campaign contributions made to unpopular 
“dissenting” political parties. Government authority over the structure of elections, and 
thus general authority to regulate the fairness of political campaigns,44 should allow 
government to mandate disclosure of the identity of campaign contributors. Even so, 
the rationale for making the elections more open and more democratic does not apply 
when uncloaking the identity of a contributor to basically marginal unpopular political 
groups would substantially discourage contributions. In this case, not only does the 
rationale of the government regulation not apply, but also the autonomy interests of the 
contributor provide a heightened justification for protecting anonymity. When faced 
with this issue, the Supreme Court in a sense found a content distinction 
constitutionally compelled.45 The Court protected the anonymity of contributors to the 
Socialist Workers Party.46 Note that this argument does not suggest general 
disempowerment of government in contexts where the structural context gives reason 
for governmental power—whether that structure involves elections or markets. Rather, 
it shows that sometimes the very rationale for governmental power suggests limits and 
exceptions. 
Protection of the dissenters’ commercial speech here might still seem in conflict 
with my third argument, specifically that the state should have authority to regulate the 
use of property as power. This conclusion is right, I believe, as a matter of principle. 
And it could be argued that even dissenting commercial enterprises should be required 
to find a way to operate—including in relation to their speech—within the legal 
                                                                                                                 
 
 44. See C. Edwin Baker, Campaign Expenditures and Free Speech, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. 
REV. 1 (1998). 
 45. See Geoffrey R. Stone & William P. Marshall, Brown v. Socialist Workers: Inequality 
as a Command of the First Amendment, 1983 SUP. CT. REV. 583. 
 46. Brown v. Socialist Workers ‘74 Campaign Comm. (Ohio), 459 U.S. 87 (1982). 
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framework that the law provides. Nevertheless, as a matter of legislative policy, here as 
elsewhere, the state ought to allow diversity in people’s expression of values. Applying 
my interpretation of Seana Shiffrin’s discussion, I tentatively suggest that despite the 
state’s declared underlying rationale for market regulation (controlling market 
amoralism), expressive freedom ought to prevail. In other words, the state should not 
focus on controlling for market amoralism, but rather the exercise of autonomous 




I have described four reasons that the fundamental ideal of speech freedom should 
not extend to commercial speech.47 I argued, first, that commercial speech is not an 
exercise of freedom because market forces dictate its content. Second, commercial 
speech is not an exercise of freedom by morally significant flesh-and-blood individuals 
to the extent that the speech is properly attributed to a legally constructed commercial 
entity. This attribution always leaves the flesh-and-blood individual free to say what 
she wishes when she leaves her commercial role, even when her speech duplicates in 
content possible messages of commercial entities. Third, commercial speech is not an 
exercise of constitutionally protected freedom because of its integral relation to market 
transactions that structurally involve exercises of power subject to state regulation 
rather than embodying individual autonomy. Fourth, commercial speech generally 
should not be protected to the extent that constitutional rights of free speech ought to 
be regarding dissent. 
In reasons and result, I join the ranks of John Stuart Mill and most American First 
Amendment absolutists—a group that includes Supreme Court Justice Hugo Black and 
scholars such as Tom Emerson, Alexander Mieklejohn, John Ely, and Hans Linde—
who all conclude that protection of speech freedom should not extend to commercial 
speech. Of possible particular note is my third argument—that the libertarian tradition 
makes a fundamental mistake when it tries to connect its emphasis on autonomy and 
                                                                                                                 
 
 47. A fifth theory might be that the First Amendment concerns only or primarily political or 
democracy-related speech. This argument could proceed in either of two ways. It might focus on 
the content of commercial speech, in which case both Redish’s article and the Court in Virginia 
Board emphasized that the content of commercial advertising can be politically relevant. 
Alternatively, it might focus on the proper political enfranchisement of the speaker and the 
contexts in which she is oriented toward the public sphere. See Robert Post, The Constitutional 
Status of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1 (2000); James Weinstein, Speech 
Categorization and the Limits of First Amendment Formalism: Lessons from Nike v. Kasky, 54 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1091 (2004). Though this second approach would justify denying 
protection to commercial speech, I put it aside because I believe the rationale for protection of 
political speech lies in a conception of legitimate government that implies both democracy and 
limits on democracy as necessary consequences of a view of legitimate government as 
necessarily respecting individual liberty and equality—as Rawls put it, a view of people as “free 
and equal.” RAWLS, supra note 25, at 13. This view makes protection of speech based on respect 
for individual autonomy more basic than protection of the subsumed category of political 
speech. This more expansive view of expressive freedom also, I believe, better describes speech 
doctrine and judicial results in the United States. 
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liberty to claims about market freedom. On this point at least, John Stuart Mill got it 
right: “the principle of individual liberty is not involved in the doctrine of free trade.”48 
                                                                                                                 
 
 48. MILL, supra note 39, at 164. 
